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This paper is concerned to identify the decline in party activism
in South Africa since before the general election of 1994.
The paper falls into three parts: a brief overview of the general
literature on the problem, including references to developments in
post-colonial Africa; a schematic account of political activism in
black politics in South Africa since the end of the second world
war; and thirdly a series of cases in local politics in Mpumalanga
at the time of the local elections of 1996 which suggest that there
are areas where local party and social movement activism is still
visible in the form of internal conflicts, or conflicts between the
ANC and its allies, notably SANCO. These cases will be used to show
the sometimes complex relations in local politics, and specifically
the varied consequences of institutionalising democracy at the
local level.
The theoretical starting point lies in the debates which followed
Oscar Kirchheimer•s famous prediction that the "mass integration"
class-based party which had politicised the European peasantry and
working class in an earlier period, had gone into decline after the
second world war, and was being displaced by the "catch-all
party".1 Kirchheimer argued that the catch-all party abandoned all
efforts "at the intellectual and moral encadrement of the
masses,... turning more fully to the electoral scene, trying to
exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more
immediate electoral success. The narrower political task and the
immediate electoral goal differ sharply from the former all-
embracing concerns..."2
Two decades later, Panebianco sharpened the political features of
the catch-all party by distinguishing such characteristics as: its
"de-ideologisation" of issues and concentration on "valence issues"
with which the larger sector of the electorate was in agreement,
such as economic development and maintenance of public order; the
increased dependence on interest groups and the transformation of
allied organisations such as trade unions, into interest groups
with weaker party ties; members' loss of political weight, and the
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decline in rank and file activism; the strengthening of leaders'
organisational power and their greater reliance on external groups
than on members in financing the organisation and keeping touch
with the electorate; weaker and discontinuous party-electoral
relations, "no longer linked to strong social settlements and to
solid and unified political sub-cultures."3 He further identified
some of the organisational changes which accompanied the
displacement or transformation of the mass party into the catch-all
party. These may be summarised under five headings:
1 Rise of professionals: the party bureaucracy gives way to party
professionals, and their functions changed from political-
administrative tasks to specialised tasks;
2 Decline of membership parties with strong vertical organisational
ties, appealing to the "electorate of belonging" (eg the working
class) ;
3 Decline of internal leaders and collegial leadership practices in
favour of public representatives and of personalised leaders;
4 A shift in from membership and the activities of collateral
organisations (eg trade unions); and
5 A shift from a stress on ideology and on the role of believers
within the organisation to a "stress on issues and leadership,
central role of the careerists and representatives of interest
groups within the organisation."*
Of course every party formation is distinctly a product of its own
historical and social environment. However, ideal types of this
kind are useful guides to detecting broad tendencies in political
parties; it is hoped to show in the second part of this paper that
some of the processes of the shift from the "mass integration"
party to the "catch-all" party may be noted in South Africa during
the recent past, and that these are likely to have implications for
the relationship within the parties, especially between central and
local levels of power.
Criticising these writers, Katz and Mair suggested that they
assumed that parties were "uniform actors", whereas in reality
parties incorporated at least three elements or faces which
interacted with one another: the "party in public office"
(parliament and government) ,- the "party on the ground" (members and
loyal supporters); and the "party in central office", which
organised and was representative of the party on the ground.5
These distinctions are helpful in assessing shifts in power between
different elements within the party and will be used in the second
3
 Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organisation and
Power, Cambridge University Press, p 263.
4
 op cit p 264.
5
 Richard Katz and Peter Mair, Party Organisations: From Civil
Society to the State, in Richard S Katz and Peter Mair, How
Parties Organise: Change and Adaptation in Party Organisation in
Western Democracies, London: Sage, 1994, p 5.
section of this paper to try and trace changes in the internal
relationships within the ANC, and between it and the state on the
one hand and its allies on the other.
The final general development noted by writers on contemporary
political parties was the displacement of the relationship between
party and "civil society" by an increasingly close relationship
with the state, a displacement signified by an identification
between party and state, and a replacement of sources of revenue in
civil society, including its own membership, with revenues provided
by the state.
The African variant
In post-colonial Africa, a variant form of the declining mass party
was noted during the mid-1960s. This variant suggests some
interesting precedents for developments in South Africa, both at
the national and the local level. Immanuel Wallerstein fi argued
that the single party was developed as an instrument of national
integration intended to contain political opponents to the regime.
He noted a shift in the role of the party after independence. Party
leaders became increasingly involved in government, and the
priorities of government increasingly superseded those of the
political party. Mass interest declined and with it the interest of
cadres who moved into government office. Financial contributions
from ordinary members fell, and the party relied more on the
contributions of well-paid politicians and civil servants. Activism
among auxiliary movements - - youth, women unions, farmers - -
attracted purges and restrictions. Mergers took place between
government and party at national and local level in which
governmental priorities prevailed over the party's. "It is argued
that the party was taking over the government. It often looked like
the reverse."7
The heightened levels of mobilisation which characterised the
period of struggle against colonial rule and the establishment of
a new democratic regime were followed by demobilisation: as Fanon
somewhat dramatically put it, the party had become the "skeleton of
its former self" serving only to "immobilise the people."B
This general prognosis was tragically substantiated in the
experiences in Kenya, both at national and at local levels after
independence.
Kenya illustrates the displacement of political activism in the
dominant party {through the alliance between the conservatives in
KANU and KADU and the exclusion of the radicals from KANU during
the 1960s) and parallel with it the centralisation of control over
6
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local authorities.*
This issue may hold significance for South Africa in the future.
PART II: SOUTH AFRICA 1945-1994
South Africa went through a period of unprecedented mobilisation
from the mid-1980s, a period which culminated in the election of
1994. This mobilisation was channelled through a range of
"alternative associations" acting under the umbrella of the Mass
Democratic Movement, aligned with but structurally and
organisationally distinct from the ANC, which was banned until
1990. The ANC took part in this mobilisation as a symbol rather
than an organisation and may have had a demobilising effect on its
allies.
Since 1994, the ANC and its allies have shown signs of a decline in
levels of activism, Control has been consolidated by the "party in
public office" over the "party on the ground" and the "party in
administration." Leaders of the Mass Democratic Movement were
assimilated into government and in some cases subsequently
marginalised.
These processes of mobilisation and demobilisation have recurred
through the long history of the ANC, and the latest developments
need to be situated within the history of the movement.
The South African experience of democratic government has been very
short, but there has been a long history of popular party and
movement politics which will be summarised presently in the
relationships between the different aspects of party politics.
Concentrating mainly on the experience of the ANC, which resonates
in the history of the PAC, popular movement and party politics have
gone through a number of stages during the past 50 years.
i MASS MOBILISATION: 1945-1960
From the second world war, South Africa experienced a period of
intensive mobilisation, involving mass protests against the pass
laws and campaigns such as the demand for a "pound a day"; the
ratification of the Freedom Charter in 1955; the women's march on
Pretoria. The Treason Trial failed to destroy the movement. This
stage culminated in the PAC's agitation against the pass laws in
1960 and the loss of life at Sharpeville, with the banning of these
movements, and their departure into exile.
ii THE POLITICS OF EXILE 1960-1990
The ANC and PAC developed as clandestine organisations cut off from
direct links with their domestic base. Although the armed struggle
which the liberation movement embarked on was intended to mobilise
domestic political support, it necessarily involved developing
capacities different from those of a mobilisation party. Emphasis
was increasingly placed on diplomatic and military located in the
9
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international rather than domestic mobilisation. The exile
political leadership, among them Thabo Mbeki and Joe Modise, were
diplomats, organisational men and military commanders, different
from the demagogic leaders who had dominated the ANC between 1945
and 1960. During this period the two movements, and particularly
the ANC, built up the organisational structures which were to form
the core of the party administration and the government after 1994.
iii MOBILISATION AND REBELLION: "INTERNAL" MASS MOBILISATION, 1970
-1990
From the early 1970s onwards a real transformation of South African
politics got under way, with major strikes leading to the formation
of highly politicised trade unions, the development of a militant
black consciousness movement, and the school-children's revolt of
1976. By the mid-1980s the unions and domestic grass roots
movements such as the civic associations had formed alliances under
the umbrella of the Mass Democratic Movement which assumed the role
of a surrogate ANC. A new generation of domestic leaders emerged.
They played a significant role in the ANC after 1990. Even at this
stage, an authoritative analysis has suggested that the association
between local grass roots movements and the ANC (symbolic rather
than organisational) may have had a demobilising effect on the
levels of political activism in the country.10
iv THE POLITICAL TRANSITION, 1989-1994
From the late 1980s the country entered a period of heightened
political activity and expectation, with marches and rallies and
intense conflicts accompanied by waves of violence. The ANC was
unbanned, its leaders were released, and it entered negotiations
with the government. Simultaneously, and contrasting markedly with
the process of heightened political mobilisation, an alternative
form of politics began to emerge, not on the streets, townships or
in the workplace, but in committee rooms and conference centres as
the political parties entered the negotiations leading to the new
constitution, and to reorganise themselves for the coming
10
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elections.
During its long existence, the ANC has only since 1994 acted as an
electoral party. Its success in the 1994 elections rested on its
reputation as the party of liberation rather than an electoral
party with a competency to organise electoral support. The choice
of a single constituency party list system for the 1994 general
elections was undoubtedly a response to a number of exigencies,
including the impossibility of assembling a voters' roll and the
state of anarchy in the country, but it was also apposite to the
character of a movement inexperienced in the routines of electoral
organisation and management. The list system boded ill for the
development of a vibrant party organisation at the constituency
level, for it made it possible for the party to insulate the
selection of public representatives from ordinary party members.
The fact that this system was partly used in the X996 local
government elections and will be used again in 1999 is significant
of a concentration of power in the "party in public office." The
ANC established "constituencies" where it holds surgeries, but
these provide no institutional mechanism for making elected members
answerable to party members at this level.
V THE ASCENT OF THE PARTY IN PUBLIC OFFICE, 1994-
The election of 1994 signified a momentous change in the ANC as it
assumed the identity of party in public office. The accession of
the venerable leaders of the ANC from half a century before to
positions of power in the state was the most potent symbol of the
political transfer of power which took place during the early
1990s. It symbolised the transformation of the movement into the
party of government, and the erstwhile heroes of an era of protest,
mobilisation and suffering, into symbols of the new state power.
The personalisation of Mandela's leadership strikingly illustrates
the displacement of collegial by personal leadership.
New relations also emerged within the ANC between its different
"faces" and in the relations between the ANC and its allies.
Broadly, the party in public office (in government, parliament, the
public service) became the ascendant force in the movement. These
changes had considerable implications for former leaders of the
MDM. Talented members of the "alternative movements" were recruited
directly into government {cabinet ministers such as Jay Naidoo,
Trevor Manuel, Alec Erwin, Mohammed Valli Moosa) or into party
administration {Cyril Ramaphosa and Cheryl Carolus.) Changes at the
national level of government had parallels in the assimilation of
many of the leaders of the MDM at lower levels of government. For
instance, four provincial prime ministers {in the seven provinces
controlled by the ANC) had been UDF activists.
These five phases in the evolution of the ANC correspond to a
distinctive style of leadership and set of relationships within the
party and between it and other elements in the society and to
distinctive styles of leadership. These phases could be represented
as geological strata, the oldest lying deepest and the most recent
nearest the surface, but all having consequences for the shape of
the political terrain. One might extend the metaphor by suggesting
that the formation began to "cool" after 1994, thus giving some
permanence to the party formation and political leadership.
THE DECLINE OF ACTIVISM IN THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS.
The assimilation of the leaders of the MDM into government
inevitably weakened the associations which they had previously led,
and therefore reduced their potential for activism. But having been
removed from the arena of activist politics, a number of them were
marginalised politically. Jay Naidoo, former secretary general of
COSATU, one of the most important figures in the union movement and
pivotal in the MDM, was appointed Minister without Portfolio in the
first cabinet. He was put in charge of the Reconstruction and
Development Programme, presented during the 1994 election campaign
as a strategy for mobilising the resources of the society to tackle
problems of poverty and powerlessness. But he did not control a
line department. Within a year or so he was moved to the Ministry
of Posts and Telecommunications, and the RDP was moved to the
deputy president's office, and has thereafter declined in
visibility.
The decline in the power and influence of Cyril Ramaphosa, former
leader of the highly successful Mine Workers' Union, after 1996 is
highly significant. Ramaphosa was at one stage tipped as a possible
successor to Mandela. He chaired the Constitutional Assembly, but
then departed from political life for a business career after the
adoption of the Constitution.
Cheryl Carolus has also had a fitful career in the ANC since 1994.
She had been a key member of the UDF during the 1980s, was one of
only two women in the ANC team that negotiated with the De Klerk
government, and was elected deputy secretary general to Ramaphosa
in 1994. She might reasonably have expected to achieve high office
either in the ANC or in government. Instead after Ramaphosa left
politics (according to her he was forced out) she was appointed
acting secretary-general of the ANC only after two other leaders
had turned the job down. It has been suggested that she has reached
the zenith of her powers: ". . .she has stepped on too many toes. She
attacked party positions, embarrassed ANC ministers and disagreed
with influential members of the organisation." It was later
reported that she was to be offered the position of High
Commissioner in London. In June she announced that she was leaving
political life to go into business.11
These examples suggest both the declining importance of civic
associations in relation to the ANC, as well as of the relatively
lesser importance of the party in central administration compared
with the party in office.
The declining role of former UDF activists during the run-up to the
draft constitution and the election was confirmed in an article by
former UDF secretary, Popo Molefe, currently premier of the north-
west province, who noted that after 1991, the UDF "scaled down its
11
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8profile as more of its functions passed to the ANC and key UDF
activists became involved in the reorganisation of the ANC".12
The other symptom of a decline in social movement activism was the
corrosion of the ANC-CP-COSATU alliance, specially after the
adoption by the government of the macro-economic policy GEAR. The
Labour Relations Act has put a strain on the relations between the
Government and the unions, especially after the Labour Court ruled
in May 1997 that a protest planned by COSATU against parts of the
Act was illegal because it had not complied with the provisions of
the Act. The opinion has been expressed that COSATU's planned
action was directed "not at business but at its ostensible ally --
the ANC government."13 Stanley Uys has suggested that this heralded
the disintegration of the "broad church" after President Mandela's
retirement in 1999.14 These developments suggest a further
evisceration of an activist role within the tripartite alliance and
the increasing importance within the ANC of governmental
priorities. The fact that in economic policy these priorities seem
to emphasise economic growth and stability has implications for
grass-roots activism. There are several indications that the advent
of the new regime threatened to eviscerate activism in the civic
associations, partly by drawing off talented individuals, and
partly by a convergence in purpose of the civics and the state.
Steven Friedman recently argued that
"many of the most articulate and talented leaders of these social
movements have been absorbed into the post-apartheid state. . . .SANCO
. . . sees itself as a watchdog on local government at the same time
as it argues with the ANC about how many of its activists are to
become members of the government over which it wants to watch...
There is a danger that argument over the respective roles of
elected representatives and civil society is really about how the
spoils of the acquisition of state power are to be divided."15
22.
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the new regime. Friedman noted the tendency for these movements to
proclaim their identification with the African National Congress.
His comments on this are interesting in the light of retrospective
claims, such as that made by Popo Molefe that there was no
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Sheila Meintjes has made a similar point in a paper on attempts to
revive an activist role in the women's movements, and the problems
they faced in trying to sustain this role after the unbanning of
the ANC. The Women•s National Coalition failed to maintain the
momentum it generated during the early 1990s, and the ANC Women's
League failed to persuade the ANC National Executive Committee to
accept a proposal for a quota on the body.16
Symptomatic of the decline of local activism since the 1994
elections was a report that SANCO was on the verge of collapse, in
part because the commercial ventures which it had entered (eg
selling insurance to its members) had failed because of the
difficulty in sustaining membership drives!17 It has been suggested
that SANCO risked its autonomy by announcing its support for the
ANC in 1999, and for Mbeki as the next ANC leader. SANCO had lost
its "sharpest brains" to government. It was close to bankruptcy,
having only 5,000 fee-paying members since December. It had been
ignored in the Masakhane campaign {to which it was opposed.) It had
backed the ANC in the local elections in 1996. But the leading
authority on civic associations, Kehla Shubane was quoted as saying
that at the grass-roots level, the civic movement had not
declined.16 However, its relationship with the ANC is
problematic, the national leadership having lost any identity
separate from the ANC, and the grass roots organisations pursuing
diverse objectives. In the next section it will be shown that SANCO
is by no means dead, and that it pursues various strategies in
different localities during the local elections of 1996.
It is neither surprising nor unexpected that the great waves of
mass mobilisation which accompanied the transition of the 1980s and
1990s should have subsided from 1994.19 Nor should the emphasis
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placed here on the subsidence be construed as a lament for the
passing of the moment.
PART III (i) LOCAL POLITICS IN MPUMALANGA: A SURVEY OF 12
AUTHORITIES.20
In this section an attempt will be made to judge whether the ANC
had established itself as a party of government in the local
authorities surveyed here. The value of using local politics to
test the problem is that local authorities exhibit interesting
variations in political relations, structures and capacities
between areas which are sometimes separated by only a few
kilometers. Undoubtedly similar variations exist within parties
organised at regional and national levels (indeed the assumptions
here are that they should) , but focusing on larger groupings tends
to produce a grossing up or aggregation of these variations.
The problem can be seen in several different ways. Had the ANC
established control over the local political arena, including
control over movement organisations such as SANCO? Was it able to
assert its authority in the local authority? Was it able to
enunciate and execute its policies?
There is a view that local government in Mpumalanga Province is
generally weak, but there are nevertheless considerable variations
between different authorities which enable us to compare relatively
weak with relatively strong councils.
The African National Congress (ANC) was by far the strongest party
in the province, holding 365 (64%) out of 568 seats. The National
Party (NP) came a poor second with 80 seats (14%).
The other parties are listed in descending order:
Independents 48 (8%)
Residents' Associations 30 (5%)
Freedom Front 24 (4%)
Other 12 (2%)
faction within the party. (Incidentally if centralisation of party
decision-making were marks of Leninism, then Margaret Thatcher and
Tony Blair would both qualify as Leninists.
20
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However despite its numerical predominance in the province as a
whole, the ANC commanded a two-thirds majority in only three local
authorities (Machadodorp, Carolina and Ogies/Phola.) Far from its
numerical strength reinforcing its authority the ANC was weak and
divided in these areas. In general, its control was far from
complete. It was often divided internally, its authority challenged
by populist groups. SANCO frequently mobilised community opinion
against ANC policy, especially on issues relating to service
payments. The ANC was confronted by blocs of white councillors
linked together through cultural affiliation, and often enjoying
long experience of the technicalities of local government.
Party divisions followed racial lines in the 12 authorities
examined here: with the exception of one Indian {the ANC chairman
of EXCO in Carolina) all ANC councillors were black; all
independents and all representatives of the NP independents, the
CP, the FF were white, as were all but one representative of
Residents' or Ratepayers' Associations. A large proportion of
independents and Ratepayers' Association representatives were in
fact right-wing whites, often with a history of association with
the Conservative Party.
A secondary instance of demobilisation was the collapse of the
white "right". In step with the intensification of the liberation
struggle from the mid-1980s, white right-wing activism escalated in
the Eastern Transvaal. The local government elections witnessed the
almost complete demise of the white right, which regularly
disguised itself as rate-payers and independents.
CASE STUDIES:
1 MIDDELBURG: SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION FROM LIBERATION MOVEMENT TO
PARTY IN OFFICE.
The ANC held 12 seats on the Council, the Greater Middelburg
Residents1 Organisation (GMRO) three; the MRO one and the NP eight.
Surprisingly, given its political background, Middelburg had
emerged as the exemplary instance of inter-party, cross-racial
cooperation and of effective local government.
Under the old regime, the CP had dominated its political life, the
AWB had a strong presence there, and "Boerekommandoes" had been
familiar spectacles. The CP declined during the 1990s, and the
GMRO, the umbrella for local independents, was not a CP front,
though one of the independents was a member or ex-member of the CP.
One of the reasons for this change may have had to do with the
lengthy period of familiarisation and cooperation between the
different political groups in the town which took place under the
aegis of the Middelburg Informal Development Forum. Another
undoubtedly lay in the political astuteness and competency of the
ANC in the town, and their deliberate pursuit of an accomodationist
policy during the period prior to the establishment of the interim
government. The Mayor had made it his business to be accessible to
the townsfolk. Complaints (for instance the mistaken claim that
12
service charges were high) tended to be non-political in character.
Populist sentiments appeared here as elsewhere. During the
election, some candidates had promised the people of Mhluzi {the
local township) houses and land in return for their support. This
introduced some strains in the relations between the Council and
Mhluzi when it became obvious that these candidates could not
deliver on their election promises. But it was not seen as a
serious problem.
Unlike some other local authorities in the Province, the Council
and officials cooperated effectively, refraining from interfering
in each other1 s sphere of competency. The ANC councillors took
official advice on technical issues. They enjoyed congenial
relations with the Town Clerk. Relations between the ANC and the
NP councillors were good, and they had distributed Council office
in a cooperative way. (The positions of Mayor and of EXCO chairman
were held by the ANC; the Deputy Mayor was a Nationalist) . The
Middelburg Observer described the parties as being in bed together.
The Mayor of Middelburg Mr Ben Mokoena was credited with the
responsibility for its good government. Mr Mokoena had been in
exile for several years. Described as charismatic, articulate,
intelligent and adept at politics, he was strongly supported by the
ANC and the community at large. He tended to be the focus of
attention in local government, leaving little space for anyone
else. He was able to take unpopular lines when needed. The Chairman
of EXCO (Sidney Choma) was also highly experienced. The GMRO was
conservative and orthodox; its members argued that politics should
not contaminate local government and that party was bad (they were
in fact CP supporters in disguise.) Their strength lay in the grasp
of one of the councillors of finance and procedures.
The Mhluzi Residents' Organisation (MRO), which held one seat, was
the vehicle of Mr G K Maseko, who was mistrusted in the community
and his organisation was described as a lot of criminals. He was
said to have had a record of arson and public violence. He was an
ex-member of the ANC who had fallen out with the party, but
continued to vote with the ANC on most issues, thus ensuring that
the ANC could usually be sure of a simple majority. On the other
hand he gained considerable influence over the ANC. The ANC and the
NP often voted together against the GMRO. The NP was relatively
quiet despite its large representation; it was difficult to discern
a Middelburg NP position, as the NP was not bound by its caucus,
either in the locality or by the national party. In reality the
Nationalists were independents, a situation with a long history in
Middelburg local politics. Businessmen stayed out of politics.
The ANC was strongly bound by its caucus, and voted as a bloc in
the Council, but it was neither inflexible or intransigent. It
consulted widely in the community, its ward councillors held
regular report back meetings in Mhluzi, and it took community
problems to the party. The ANC in Middelburg had strong links to
the central and provincial governments, which enabled it to
anticipate national and provincial legislation. All Middelburg
councillors, including the ANC representatives, were highly
critical of the provincial government which they perceived to be
13
inefficient and arrogant.
The strength of the ANC had its roots in the history of the
struggle in Middelburg, which had been so well-organised that it
had earned the sobriquet of "Little Kremlin". Middelburg activists
had brought Black Consciousness to the eastern Transvaal, and local
struggles echoed the Soweto riots of 1976. There were more exiles
and political prisoners there than in the rest of Mpumalanga put
together.
ANC activists were well educated, skilled and politically aware.
They had organised a highly disciplined, goal-oriented resistance
to apartheid, avoiding needless destruction. They had used boycotts
and non-payment campaigns to achieve specific objectives, and had
refrained from these strategies once they had served their ends.
This unusual stance enabled them to resist the common populist
attitude of entitlement to free services. Because of this history,
the ANC had adapted well to the changing style of politics from
protest to cooperation. Its main weakness was that it had not
mastered procedures. Middelburg reflects almost exactly the
trajectory of change outlined in the earlier parts of this paper.
The really interesting feature, locally, as nationally, is that the
experience of resistance contributed to political competency as
well as legitimacy.
2 TWO DISASTER AREAS: LEANDRA21 AND OGIES/PHOLA
These authorities failed to produce a coherent political formation
capable of giving direction to local government.
Political problems in the Council reflected the socio-economic
problems faced in Lebahong. The original population of Lebohang had
been overwhelmed by the recent influx of "foreigners" which
produced conflict over resources. Half the population of Lebahong
was under 25 years of age. Political conflict had a generational
component. SANCO's base lay in the older, more established
communities. The ANC was fairly new and got support from shack-
dwellers .
There was political conflict over the mayorship and the leadership
of EXCO,the Mayor and the EXCO chairman quarrelling over who
should be Mayor. The Mayor Mr Nhlapo had connexions to SANCO, while
Mr Nkabinde, the chairman of EXCO, represented the local ANC.
This quarrel contaminated municipal government and demoralised
local officials. The people of Lebohang questioned the legitimacy
and efficacy of the TLC. Councillors complained that the community
mistrusted them. A record of abuses of the Mayor1 s Fund by the
previous TLC continued to hang over the Council.
There were generational conflicts in the Council. The older
councillors were white and non-ANC; the black councillors (eight
out of 20 of whom were under the age of 30) saw procedures as the
heritage of the apartheid era. Most young councillors had entered
community affairs during the mobilisation years of the 1980s and
21
 Leandra comprised Leandra (formerly Leslie) with the
adjacent township Lebohang.
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saw themselves to be motivated by "struggle" values. Their
behaviour was incomprehensible to officials who were mostly much
older and antagonistic towards populist political style. The
township mass meeting continued to be main site of activity. But
decisions taken in one forum were often inconsistent with decisions
taken in another.
Some saw election to the Council as the route to personal
advancement. Some councillors were employees of council, leading to
the perception of a gravy train activity.
Various constituencies in Lebohang were actively engaged in
delegitimising the Council. There was a bizarre alliance between
the white right in Leslie and a shadowy Lebahong Residents'
Association allegedly with links to the and PAC and IFP. The white
partners in the alliance were closet AWB and Volksf ronters
associated in a ratepayers association (the Leandra Inwoners
Belastings Assosiasie) . They were trying to get a flat rate for
Leslie and Eendracht (as in Lebohang). The Masakhane campaign had
been unsuccessful in Leandra.
ii OGIES/PHOLA
Government in Ogies was without cohesion or direction, its
political leadership was "either absent, incompetent or
unrespected."22 Official positions were held by people who were
politically contentious or who were incompetent and lacked
diligence. For instance the previous town clerk had been suspended
after 33 years service to make way for Mr Sibaya who had previously
been his personal assistant and had less experience and knowledge.
Mr Petrus Molapo, the ANC chairman of EXCO, was widely regarded as
a "trouble-maker", who, according to non-ANC councillors, was
probably involved in anti-payment campaigns in Phola. ANC
councillors were divided, some supporting and some opposing him,
and the independents aligned themselves with the group who opposed
Molapo.
The Mayor, Mr "Bigboy" Radebe, was competent and respected, but
only three of the ANC councillors supported him. Two others
supported the chairman of EXCO, Mr Molapo.
The Council had few dealings with the provincial government and
none with the national government. Relations between the Council
and SANCO were antagonistic. SANCO ran an anti-payment campaign in
Phola which subverted the Masakhane campaign. Mass meetings
achieved little. Ogies encapsulated all the worst problems of local
government in the new South Africa.
PARTY COHESION AND THE CAPACITY TO MANAGE
The internal cohesion of the ANC and the state of its relations
with SANCO were important in a number of councils. Support from the
provincial party was also sometimes a factor. Very often these
determined the capacity of councils to manage the problem of
service payments. Successful management of this problem seems to
Report, op cit p 183.
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have depended on several of the following conditions being present:
a united and resolute ANC Council; a supportive SANCO (or other
similar associations) ; an active community political life dominated
by the ANC. Here the experiences of Dullstroom, Delmas/Botleng,
Machadodorp, Lydenburg, Sabie and Hendrina, will be considered.
DULLSTROOM AND BOTLENG/DELMAS: SANCO RESCUES THE ANC
Dullstroom provides a good example of the way in which poor
relations between the Council and the community contributed to
precipitating a strike among municipal workers, but in which the
ANC Council maintained its authority because of the support it
received from the provincial party and from SANCO.
Relations between the ANC councillors and the black community were
tense because of the widespread belief that the councillors had
failed to deliver on the promises they had made during the
election. Relations deteriorated even further after the Council
refused to grant municipal workers a wage increase and there was a
service payment boycott in Sakhele, the adjacent township. The
boycott was accompanied by references to "fat cats" and "gravy
trains".
The municipal workers formed the Dullstroom Forum to express their
grievances. The provincial ANC was brought in to mediate between
the Forum and the Council. The ANC enjoyed close relations with the
South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO). Indeed the ANC
was only able to deal effectively with the service boycott because
of the support it received from SANCO.
In Delmas/Botleng, too, SANCO played a supportive role. There the
President of the local SANCO branch {and a member of both the ANC
and the SACP) adopted a somewhat unusual stance towards the problem
of payment defaulters, suggesting that the Council should cut the
bulk supply of services to Botleng in order to collectivise the
effects of non-payment. This Council was unusual in that although
white independents were more familiar with procedure than the ANC,
the ANC had superior political skills because of their experience
in the civics. Generally they had a strong sense of their political
competency.
MACHADODORP: "INDIVIDUALISTIC" ANC; HOSTILE SANCO
A similar, but more complex, situation developed at Machadodorp,
precipitated by a weak and divided ANC, poor relations with
officials, and a hostile stance by SANCO. The ANC enjoyed an
overall majority on the Council with seven seats, but three of them
had stood as independents.
The ANC operated as a political party but allegiances were
described as "individualistic", with many personal clashes. For
instance a clash ensued over the election of Aletta Nhlapo as
mayor. A veteran of the struggle, but semi-literate, she was
unsuited to institutional politics. She was attacked by the
Nationalists, but also lost support from within the ANC. She
accused her ANC colleagues of bowing to racism.
Machadodorp experienced a crisis soon after the election over non-
payment of service charges. In November 1996 the Council cut the
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water supply. The black community then put pressure on councillors
to reverse the decision. As in other local authorities in the
province, councillors did not feel free or willing to accept
responsibility for tough decisions, tending to buckle in the face
of community pressures, lacking the independence and political
resources needed for effective government.
There were tensions between officials which tended to run along on
party lines between the NP and the CP and the FF. The NP was very
weak. The independents were prominent locals who voiced the
discontents of the white population. Neither the CP nor the FF had
much influence.
Strains in the Council reflected political relations in the
community. Political relations in eMthonjene, Machadodorp1s
township, were complex and conflictual, with conflicts within the
ANC, between the ANC and the civics, and between new and old
residents. In common with other local authorities, tensions arose
over the struggle for limited resources. These tensions were
overlaid by racial cleavages.
SANCO organised fortnightly meetings in the township, mobilising
sentiment against the Council. SANCO functioned increasingly as an
opposition, expressing dissatisfaction with "system" politics, and
putting populist pressures on the Council. SANCO used the RDP to
justify its anti-system stance.
LYDENBURG: ANC VERSUS "ANC"
Lydenburg presented yet a different face of the same problem, with
internal weaknesses reinforcing attempts to impose caucus decisions
without debate, and with SANCO performing an oppositional role.
Surprisingly, the consequences were less unsettling than one might
have imagined.
The ANC caucused all decisions and took them to Council as faits
accompli, thus concealing internal divisions. Other parties and the
officials resented this tough party line. One of the deleterious
consequences was to undermine the ability of individual councillors
to take any initiative.
The ANC held regular mass meetings in Mashishing, including
meetings with the Indian community. Opposition to the ANC came from
a group calling itself the "ANC" led by an ANC list candidate who
had failed to get elected. This rival "ANC" undermined the
Council's efforts to promote Masakhane. The group stated that they
would stand in the next election but stood little chance of
success.
These problems were exacerbated by SANCO, which was believed to be
holding its own meetings in Mashishing where they contradicted the
views of ANC councillors. In the area generally, SANCO was
beginning to assert itself as an independent force, expressing
unhappiness with the compromises entered into by the ANC and the
fear that these compromises would take place in Lydenburg. However
there was strong community support for ANC councillors. The ANC had
so far managed to contain the influence of populist politics.
However Lydenburg had not faced the sort of issue that arose in
Machadodorp. It was not clear how the Council would cope if they
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did.
SABIE: THE ANC VERSUS THE "CENTRAL COMMITTEE"
The ANC held five seats, the NP one and independents four. One
independent stood as a ratepayer; another was a member of the CP.
Party caucuses did not decide issues before meetings, and debates
tended to be a-political except on very controversial proposals.
ANC councillors often disagreed among themselves.
An ANC splinter emerged, calling itself the "Central Committee".
It consisted of aspirant councillors who had failed to get elected
on to the ANC list and drew its support from new squatter
settlements in the area. The Central Committee worked to undermine
the Council and discouraged people from paying services. The
Council and provincial ANC leaders tried to meet them but they
continued to operate as a rival ANC faction. However the Central
Committee failed to disrupt party unity, possibly because the other
parties in Sabie and Simele were also opposed to it, fearing that
it had the potential to stir up populist "trouble" in the next
election.
The Central Committee obtained membership cards from the provincial
ANC. The dominant faction asked the provincial party to stop
supplying them with cards and to intervene to assert their
hegemony. These efforts were unsuccessful. Despite these problems,
politics in Sabie were healthier than in Lydenburg. Councillors in
both areas were under pressure from populists. Links between Sabie
and the Province were weak.
The squatter settlements were occupied by the families of workers
on timber plantations and related industries, the bread-winners
having previously lived in single-sex hostels. They did not have
long-standing ties in Sabie and were regarded as outsiders and
competitors for jobs by the older residents of Simele. They were
influenced by two leaders of the Central Committee, Mandla Skosana
(no known previous experience of politics) and S K Nkosi (a member
of both the ANC and SACP) who had failed to get nominated to the
ANC list. The level of political interest was low among the town-
folk, and there was little likelihood that mass meetings would
attract a big attendance there. The ANC hosted regular meetings in
Simele, usually once a month.
HENDRINA: INTER-PARTY CONSENSUS; INTRA-PARTY VACILLATION
Political relations in Hendrina were less polarised than Carolina
because racial tensions were less pronounced, or perhaps they were
less visible. The EXCO was an all-party institution. Councillors in
both towns expressed strong commitment to the idea that community
interests should transcend party affiliation. The Council was
dominated by the spirit of appeasement, particularly on the issue
of rates and rentals, and this resulted in inconsistencies in
policy.
The ANC had stood for election on the platform that they would
reduce rates and rentals; but in office they tried to take a strong
line on defaulters. They realised that assessments would have to be
increased if the Council were to manage its problems. There was a
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small Pan African Congress (PAC) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)
presence in Hendrina, but it does not appear to have made any
impact on local politics.
Officials often took advantage of ANC councillors1 lack of grasp of
procedural issues, and tried to manipulate Council business by
filtering out contentious issues. The ANC councillors became
"inanimate objects in the system of power relations." 2i
The level of political mobilisation in Kwazamkuhle was low. Only a
minority of potential voters had been registered for the 1995
elections, which suggested a lack of energy on the part of
officials and the organisational weakness of the ANC. Hendrina
suffered from the combination of a politically inarticulate
population and a low level of party capability to project community
demands.
CAROLINA: ANC VERSUS POPULISM
The ANC held seven out of the ten seats on the Carolina Council.
The FF held two seats and the CP one. Despite having a majority on
the Council, the ANC was weak and disunited, and political
divisions were based on personality. Councillors had a record of
inconsistency, fluctuating between populist and accomodationist
positions. The ANC held regular, often tumultuous, monthly meetings
in Silobela. The Mayor of Carolina, Mr Shabangu, was very popular,
though he often took the flak for problems. He was believed to have
connexions with Thabo Mbeki and was regarded as an "external" ANC
import. SANCO had played a major role in Silobela during the 1980s,
but had subsequently faded away and its supporters came to operate
under the ANC umbrella.
A divisive element in Carolina came in the shape of "Mama" Thela,
an aging activist (a local version of Winnie Mandela) who dominated
politics in Silobela and Kwazomokhuhle, her support base coming
from the poorer people. She had an ally in Mr Lusenga, a local
version of Peter Mokaba. Some ANC councillors who were antagonistic
towards Mrs Thela supported the idea of a white deputy mayor as a
way of removing her from the EXCO, but people in Silobela had
little confidence in them. There were low levels of political
mobilisation in Carolina.
CONCLUSION
The ANC was the predominant party formation in the local
authorities of Mpumalanga Province, but as is evident from this
account its authority was often precarious and sometimes non-
existent. Several common problems which have been identified will
be briefly addressed.
THE ANC AS GOVERNING PARTY
There were large variations in the political competency and
capacity of the ANC. In some areas it governed on the basis of a
consensus; in others it sought to impose decisions made previously
Report, op cit p 136.
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in caucus, often causing resentment among other councillors. In
some it governed with vigour and competency; in others it was
enervated by internal strife, conflicts with SANCO and poor
community support or down-right opposition.
STRAINS OF TRANSITION
The strains of transition the ANC was undergoing from a liberation
movement to the party of government which were outlined in earlier
sections of this paper were evident in these sketches. They include
the tensions between councils and communities over non-delivery;
the ambiguous stance in some councils towards non-payment; the
frequent internal divisions in the ANC, or between it and its
ostensible partners in the alliance ( particularly SANCO),
divisions articulated along a populist-accomodationist cleavage.
In some areas, most notably Middelburg, the ANC had successfully
undergone the transition to a party of government, and although
there were some signs of strain, they did not seem to be severe. By
contrast in an area like Leandra the ANC had not established itself
sufficiently well, either during the apartheid era or subsequently,
to articulate the major interests of the local community.
The process of party formation {with a corresponding shift in the
relations between the three faces of party) worked unevenly
through local politics in Mpumalanga, with many variations in pace
and direction. Overall, the transition has been imperfectly
accomplished, clearly manifest few areas. A possible disjuncture
will reveal itself between the politics of localities in this
province, and the politics of the central and provincial state.
POPULISM 24
The tensions between populist pressures, often claiming to express
the voices {authentically or otherwise) of marginal and subordinate
elements in the communities, offer insights into several problems
in democratic South Africa. The first is the endemic structural
problem of poverty in the society, and the predicament which
politicians face in trying to address them. Frequently the
predicament emerged because candidates had made electoral promises
which they could not fulfil, opening elected officials to attack by
groups working outside of the institutionalised political arena.
A major source of conflict between Councils and local communities,
located along what has been loosely described here as a
accomodationist/populist cleavage, reflected the extreme poverty
experienced in those communities. The most important issue
presenting itself along this cleavage concerned payments for
2i
 The appellation populism is not used here in the derogatory
style common in current South African analyses. On the contrary it
is viewed as a significant articulation of a crisis in South
Africa's democratisation which exposes contradictions between the
expectations of radical change on the one hand and the limited
capacity and changing purposes of the new regime.
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services and rates. A voluntarist gloss has sometimes been placed
on this issue (not least in the Masikhane campaign) which implies
that communities chose to pay or not to pay. This may be true in
some cases, but certainly not all. The issue underscores the way in
which poverty corrodes the legitimacy of government.
Secondly, parties were weakly articulated in many areas. It should
be emphasised that although the weakness of the ANC has been widely
commented on, the ANC had in fact achieved a greater degree of
coherency than any other political group, and that it seemed to be
the ascendant political formation in Mpumalanga. The fact that the
far right organised covertly may suggest that it was embarked on a
process of decline or disintegration in the longer term.
What was evident were the strains and contradictions of a
liberation movement experiencing the transition to institutional
politics. As the dominant representative of both forms of politics,
the ANC experienced these strains in a particularly acute form.
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